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come: “We ignore the behavior of the monetary
aggregates at our peril” (Poole, 1999); and “Clearly,
more talk does not necessarily mean more trans-
parency” (Poole, 2005a).
THE BEGINNINGS OF RESEARCH
ON POLICY RULES IN
STOCHASTIC MODELS CIRCA 1970
Let me begin by reviewing Bill Poole’s
deservedly famous 1970 QJE article. In my view,
that paper conveyed two novel messages, one
about dealing with uncertainty and the other
about reducing uncertainty.
An Approach to Monetary Policy That
Could Deal with Existing Uncertainty
The first message was presented in the form
of a simple graphical ISLM analysis, and soon
after textbook writers incorporated this analysis
in their macroeconomics and money and bank-
ing textbooks. At the time Poole wrote his paper,
the typical IS and LM curves were drawn without
a notion that they could move around stochasti-
cally. Bill Poole showed how adding exogenous
disturbances to the curves provided a simple
framework for monetary policy decisionmaking
under uncertainty.
While the framework was simple, the message
was extremely useful: When shocks to money
demand are very large, central banks should target
the interest rate because those shocks would other-
wise cause harmful swings in interest rates. When




t is a pleasure to participate in this con-
ference and join in the recognition of Bill
Poole. My remarks build on two of Bill
Poole’s important contributions to monetary
theory: his 1970 Quarterly Journal of Economics
(QJE) paper on monetary policy under uncer-
tainty and his more recent series of lucid short
papers on predictability, transparency, and policy
rules, many of which were adapted from speeches
and published in the Review of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
At the same time I want to express my appre-
ciation for Bill’s extraordinary service in public
policy: starting in the 1960s as a member of the
staff of the Federal Reserve Board, where he wrote
his 1970 QJE paper and many others; then later as
a member of the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers during the difficult disinflation of the
early 1980s, where his role in explaining and
supporting the Fed’s price stability efforts was
essential; and most recently as president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, where his
emphasis on good communication and good
policy has contributed, and will continue to
contribute, to improvements in the conduct of
monetary policy. Regarding these contributions I
give two of my favorite examples of Bill Poole’s
many pithy phrases which I hope will ring in
monetary policymakers’ ears for many years to
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demand are very large, central banks should target
the money supply because the interest rate will
move to mitigate these demand shocks. Hence, the
Poole analysis showed explicitly how policy-
makers could deal with exogenous uncertainty
in a formal mathematical way.
An Approach to Monetary Policy That
Could Reduce Uncertainty
The second message was more complex and
profound, and also more relevant for my purpose
here. Poole investigated what he called a “com-
bination policy” involving both the interest rate
and the money supply, and he examined its prop-
erties in an economy-wide dynamic stochastic
model. The model, with the combination policy
inserted, could be written as a vector autoregres-
sion. Poole showed how to compute the steady-
state stochastic distribution implied by the model.
He also showed how to find the optimal policy
to minimize the variance of real gross domestic
product (GDP) around the mean of this stochastic
steady-state distribution. The method involved
finding the homogeneous and particular parts of
the solution and then writing the endogenous
variable as an infinite weighted sum of lagged
shocks—what is now commonly called an
impulse response function.
The combination policy had key features of
active monetary policy rules in use today. The
policy involved the money supply (M), the interest
rate (r), and lagged values of real GDP (Y). Poole
wrote it algebraically as
where the coefficients c1′ and c2′ were determined
to minimize the variance of real GDP in the steady-
state stochastic distribution. He showed that the
optimal policy yielded a smaller loss than the
fixed interest rate policy, the fixed money supply
policy, or a combination policy that ignored the
reactions to lagged real GDP.
Note that, although the rule was active, there
was no discretion here. Once those parameters
were chosen, they would stay for all time. People
criticized Poole for this rule approach and argued
Mcc r Y =′ +′+ 12lagged￿ values￿ of￿ ,
instead in favor of discretion. They said that
policymakers could see or forecast the shocks to
the LM curve and the IS curve and adjust the
policy instruments as they saw fit without having
to stick to any one policy rule. For example, I have
a vivid memory of discussing the Poole paper
with Franco Modigliani after I presented a paper
at MIT later in the decade. He insisted that there
was no reason to constrain policymakers the way
Poole did. There was still an enormous resistance
to policy rules, even the active sort, at this time.
However, although discretionary actions might
improve performance in a given situation, the
possibility of discretion, and especially its misuse,
could add to the uncertainty already in the mar-
kets. The advantage of Poole’s active policy rules
was that they were more predictable and could
therefore reduce uncertainty. The second lesson
from Poole’s 1970 paper was thus that policy-
making based on rules would improve economic
performance by reducing uncertainty compared
with policymaking based on pure discretion.
This same basic stochastic dynamic model-
ing approach was applied again and again in the
1970s and 1980s, eventually to more complex
empirically estimated models with rational expec-
tations and sticky prices. Optimal rules were
computed in these newer models. Over time the
resistance to active policy rules began to weaken.
Most surprising was that actual monetary policy
decisions became more predictable and could
even be described closely by policy rules. Most
rewarding was that the more predictable rule-like
behavior yielded improved policy performance.
And most interesting is that we can now look
back at this period of greater predictability and
learn from it.
RULES OF THUMB IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR
An unanticipated advantage—at least from
the vantage point of 1970—of the more predictable
behavior by central banks has been the response
of the private sector. Recognizing that the central
bank’s interest rate settings are following more
regular rule-like responses to such variables as
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these responses into account in projecting future
variables and in developing their own rules of
thumb for making decisions. An important exam-
ple is the formation of expectations of future
interest rates, which affect bond traders’ and
investors’ decisions and thereby influence long-
term interest rates, as has been emphasized by
Poole in his more recent writings. I quote from a
paper he gave earlier this year (Poole, 2007, p. 6):
What our analysis missed a generation ago was
that the typical model with only one interest
rate could not possibly allow for stabilizing
market responses in long rates when the central
bank set the short rate. Of course, macro econo-
metric models did have both short and long
rates, but the structure of the models did not
permit analysis of the sort I am discussing
because the typical term structure equation
made the long rate a distributed lag on the
short rate. The model’s short rate, in turn, was
determined by monetary policymakers setting
it directly or by the money market under a
policy determining money growth.
Once we allow expectations to uncouple
the current long rate from the current short
rate, the situation changes dramatically. The
market can respond to incoming information
in a stabilizing way without the central bank
having to respond. Long bond rates can change,
and change substantially, while the federal
funds rate target remains constant.
In this example, the private sector has adapted
to a particular policy rule in which the short-term
interest rate rises by a predictable amount when
inflation rises. Thus, if expectations of inflation
rise, the private sector will predict that the central
bank will raise short-term interest rates in the
future; traders will then bid down bond prices,
raising long-term interest rates, and thereby miti-
gating the inflationary impulse before the central
bank action is needed.
There are other examples where private sector
behavior has adapted to rule-like behavior of the
central bank. Consider foreign exchange markets.
Empirical studies show that when there is a sur-
prise increase in inflation, the immediate reaction
in foreign exchange markets is an appreciation
of the currency. Yet conventional price theory
would predict the opposite, a negative correlation
between exchange rates and inflation, because
higher prices make goods at home relatively
expensive, requiring a depreciation of the cur-
rency to keep purchasing power from moving too
far away from parity. But the regular central bank
interest rate response to inflation explains the
empirical correlation. How? An increase in infla-
tion implies that the central bank will raise the
interest rate, which makes the currency more
attractive, bidding up the exchange rate.
There are many other examples where indi-
viduals and institutions in the private sector adapt
to policy-induced correlations. In effect, they are
creating their own rule-like behavior, their own
rules of thumb, and we are probably unaware of
most of them. Indeed, the individuals who act on
them may not even know that they derive from
the rule-like behavior of policymakers. Of course,
it is not only the private sector in the United
States. Markets all over the world follow closely
what the Fed is likely to do.
And it is not only the private sector. Central
banks take account of the predictable behavior
of the other central banks and in particular the
behavior of the Federal Reserve, which matters
greatly for their own decisions. For example, the
recent June 2007 Monetary Policy Report of the
Norges Bank states that “It cannot be ruled out
that a wider interest rate differential will lead to
an appreciation of the krone. This may suggest a
gradualist approach in interest rate setting.” In
other words, actions by the Federal Reserve that
affect the interest rate differential will in turn
influence interest rates set by other central banks.
This effect can also occur automatically—
another rule of thumb—if model simulations
used to set interest rates at central banks assume,
as they usually do, that other central banks follow
such policy rules.
An implication of this development is that if
central banks depart from their regular responses,
then they run the risk of disrupting private sector
rules of thumb. Even if they explain the reason
for the irregular behavior as clearly as possible,
emphasizing that it is temporary, some individuals
or institutions may continue operating with the
old rules of thumb unaware that these rules have
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correlations.
For example, during the period from 2002 to
2005, the interest rate in the United States fell well
below levels that would have been predicted
from the behavior of the Federal Reserve during
most of the period during the Great Moderation.
Using modern time-series methods, Frank Smets
and Marek Jaroncin ´ski (2008) showed in their
paper for this conference that there was such a
deviation, and they linked the deviation to the
boom and bust in housing prices and construc-
tion. In Taylor (2007), I argued that the resulting
acceleration of housing starts and housing prices,
as well as the low interest rates, may have upset
rules of thumb that mortgage originators were
using to assess the payment probabilities based
on various characteristics of the borrower. Their
programs are usually calibrated in a cross section
at a point in time. If housing prices start rising
rapidly, the cross section will show increased
payment probabilities, but the programs will miss
this time-series element. When housing prices
reverse, the models will break down. It would
have been very difficult to predict a breakdown
in the rules of thumb such as the mortgage under-
writing programs, but if it had not been that rule
of thumb, it might have been another.
Another related example was the negligible
response of long-term interest rates when the
Federal Reserve raised short-term interest rates
in 2004 and 2005. This might be explained by
this same deviation. Investors may have felt that
the Fed had departed from the kind of rule that
formed the basis of the longer-term interest rate
responses of the kind discussed in the above
quote by Poole.
Two examples from international monetary
policy issues are also worth noting. Following
the Russian debt default and financial crisis of
1998 there was a global contagion that affected
emerging markets with little connection to Russia.
The contagion even reached the United States,
led to the Long Term Capital Management crisis,
and caused enough of a freeze-up in U.S. markets
that the Federal Reserve reduced the interest rate
by 75 basis points. In contrast, following a very
similar default and financial crisis in Argentina
in 2001, there was virtually no contagion. The
main difference between these two episodes in
my view is predictability. In the case of Russia,
the International Monetary Fund suddenly
removed financial support, only one month after
renewing it. This surprise disrupted the world’s
financial markets. In contrast, in the case of
Argentina, the International Monetary Fund
gradually reduced support and was as clear as it
possibly could be in its intentions. Hence, there
was little surprise. The default and currency crises
were discounted by the time they happened.
Another international example is the currency
intervention policy of the United States and the
other key currency countries. There has been no
intervention by the United States or Europe in
these markets since September 2000. And since
March 2004, Japan has not intervened. Moreover,
most policymakers in these countries have sug-
gested a strong aversion to intervention in the
currency markets. In effect, compared with a
policy of frequent intervention, as in the 1980s
and 1990s, the currency policy has become much
more predictable. The assumption of zero inter-
vention in most circumstances is a good one.
What has been the result? The behavior of the
major currencies has been less volatile and even
the volatility of volatility has come down.
It is difficult to prove causality in any of
these examples, and certainly more research is
needed. Our experience with different degrees of
predictability is increasing and strongly suggests
advantages of policy predictability and risks of
unpredictability.
Toward Greater Predictability
There have been great strides in improving
monetary policy predictability at the Federal
Reserve and other central banks in recent years, as
Bill Poole has documented and explained (Poole,
2003 and 2005a,b; Poole and Rasche, 2003). Can
we make monetary policy even more predictable?
One suggestion is to publish the Fed’s balance
sheet on a daily basis, or at least the Fed balances
that commercial banks hold at the Fed. This would
make it easier to interpret episodes where the
central bank decides to provide additional liquid-
ity in the overnight money market, as on August
9 and 10 of this year. The available data on repos
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need to interpret these actions and to distinguish
them from monetary policy actions aimed at over-
all macroeconomic goals of price stability and
output stability.
Another suggestion would be to publish some
of the key assumptions used in formulating policy,
including potential GDP and/or the GDP gap, or
at least publish these with a shorter lag. This
would make it easier for the private sector to
assess the deviations from policy rules. In this
regard, it is interesting that Bill Poole’s (2006)
recent analysis of the Fed’s policy rule could not
go beyond 2001, because the data on the GDP gap
were not released beyond that date.
What about the Federal Reserve formally
announcing numerical inflation targets as other
central banks have done? I have suggested moving
slowly in this direction because a sudden change
could be misunderstood, and because policy has
worked well for two decades with a more informal
inflation target. A further lengthening of the infla-
tion forecast horizon for the Monetary Policy
Report would be an example of a more gradual
change and would be a good step in my view.
I have been concerned that placing more
emphasis on a numerical inflation target could
take emphasis away from predictability in setting
the instruments. From the perspective of a policy
rule approach, publishing one part of the rule—
the inflation target—and not publishing other
parts—the reaction coefficients—would create an
asymmetry in a direction away from the regular
reactions of the instruments that I have stressed in
these remarks. Perhaps there is a way to prevent
creating such an asymmetry. For example, the
possibility of a joint announcement might be con-
sidered, perhaps both a target range for the infla-
tion rate, from 1.5 to 2.5 percent, and a target
range for the reaction coefficient of the interest
rate to the inflation rate, from 1.5 to 2.5 percent,
but there are many other possibilities.
CONCLUSION
In these remarks I have tried to convince you
of the importance of being predictable in monetary
policy, building on Bill Poole’s paper written
nearly four decades ago and on more recent expe-
rience with different degrees of predictability in
practice. One of the key points, which needs
much more research, is how the private sector and
other public sector institutions develop rules of
thumb that are based, perhaps unknowingly, on
the systematic rule-like behavior of the monetary
authorities. These private sector rules of thumb
can improve the operation of the economy, but
they can be broken in unanticipated and disrup-
tive ways if policy becomes less predictable even
for a short time and even if policymakers make
their very best efforts to explain why.
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ill Poole’s career in the Federal
Reserve System spans two decades
separated by a quarter of a century.
From 1964 to 1974, Bill was an econ-
omist on the staff of the Board’s Division of
Research and Statistics. He then left to join the
economics faculty at Brown University, where
he stayed for nearly 25 years. Bill rejoined the
Fed in 1998 as president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, so he is now approaching the
completion of his second decade in the System.
As it happens, each of Bill’s two decades in
the System was a time of considerable research
and analysis on the issue of how economic uncer-
tainty affects the making of monetary policy, a
topic on which Bill has written and spoken many
times. I would like to compare the state of knowl-
edge on this topic during Bill’s first decade in
the System with what we have learned during
his most recent decade of service. The exercise
is interesting in its own right and has the added
benefit of giving me the opportunity to highlight
Bill’s seminal contributions in this line of research.
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
FIRST PERIOD: 1964-74
In 1964, when Bill began his first stint in the
Federal Reserve System, policymakers and
researchers were becoming increasingly confident
in the ability of monetary and fiscal policy to
smooth the business cycle. From the traditional
Keynesian perspective, which was the dominant
viewpoint of the time, monetary policy faced a
long-term tradeoff between inflation and unem-
ployment that it could exploit to keep unemploy-
ment low over an indefinitely long period at an
acceptable cost in terms of inflation. Moreover,
improvements in econometric modeling and the
importation of optimal-control methods from
engineering were seen as having the potential to
tame the business cycle.
Of course, the prevailing optimism had its
dissenters, notably Milton Friedman. Friedman
believed that the inherent complexity of the
economy, the long and variable lags with which
monetary policy operates, and the political and
bureaucratic influences on central bank decision-
making precluded policy from fine-tuning the
level of economic activity. Friedman advocated the
use of simple prescriptions for monetary policy—
such as the k percent money growth rule—which
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while avoiding the pitfalls of attempting to fine-
tune the economy in the face of pervasive uncer-
tainty (Friedman, 1968).
Other economists were more optimistic than
Friedman about the potential benefits of activist
policies. Nevertheless, they recognized that the
fundamental economic uncertainties faced by
policymakers are a first-order problem and that
improving the conduct of policy would require
facing that problem head on. During this decade,
those researchers as well as sympathetic policy-
makers focused especially on three areas of eco-
nomic uncertainty: the current state of the
economy, the structure of the economy (including
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy),
and the way in which private agents form expec-
tations about future economic developments and
policy actions.
Uncertainty about the current state of the
economy is a chronic problem for policymakers.
At best, official data represent incomplete snap-
shots of various aspects of the economy, and even
then they may be released with a substantial lag
and be revised later. Apart from issues of measure-
ment, policymakers face enormous challenges in
determining the sources of variation in the data.
For example, a given change in output could be
the result of a change in aggregate demand, in
aggregate supply, or in some combination of the
two.
As most of my listeners know, Bill Poole
tackled these issues in a landmark 1970 paper,
which examined how uncertainty about the state
of the economy affects the choice of the operating
instrument for monetary policy (Poole, 1970). In
the simplest version of his model, Bill assumed
that the central bank could choose to specify its
monetary policy actions in terms of a particular
level of a monetary aggregate or a particular value
of a short-term nominal interest rate. If the cen-
tral bank has only partial information about dis-
turbances to money demand and to aggregate
demand, Bill showed that the optimal choice of
policy instrument depends on the relative vari-
ances of the two types of shocks. In particular,
using the interest rate as the policy instrument is
the better choice when aggregate demand is rela-
tively stable but money demand is unstable, with
money growth being the preferable policy instru-
ment in the opposite case.
Bill was also a pioneer in formulating simple
feedback rules that established a middle ground
between the mechanical approach advocated by
Friedman and the highly complex prescriptions
of optimal-control methods. For example, Bill
wrote a Federal Reserve staff paper titled “Rules-
of-Thumb for Guiding Monetary Policy” (Poole,
1971). Because his econometric analysis of the
available data indicated that money demand was
more stable than aggregate demand, Bill formu-
lated a simple rule that adjusted the money growth
rate in response to the observed unemployment
rate. Bill was also practical in noting the pitfalls
of mechanical adherence to any particular policy
rule; in this study, for example, he emphasized
that the proposed rule was not intended “to be
followed to the last decimal place or as one that
is good for all time [but]…as a guide—or as a
benchmark—against which current policy may
be judged” (p. 152).
Uncertainty about the structure of the economy
also received attention during that decade. For
example, in his elegant 1967 paper, Bill Brainard
showed that uncertainty about the effect of policy
on the economy may imply that policy should
respond more cautiously to shocks than would
be the case if this uncertainty did not exist.
Brainard’s analysis has often been cited as provid-
ing a theoretical basis for the gradual adjustment
of policy rates of most central banks. Alan Blinder
has written that the Brainard result was “never
far from my mind when I occupied the Vice
Chairman’s office at the Federal Reserve. In my
view…a little stodginess at the central bank is
entirely appropriate” (Blinder, 1998, p. 12).
A key source of uncertainty became evident
in the late 1960s and 1970s as a result of highly
contentious debates about the formation of expec-
tations by households and firms. Friedman (1968)
and Ned Phelps (1969) were the first to highlight
the central importance of expectations formation,
arguing that the private sector’s expectations
adjust in response to monetary policy and there-
fore preclude any long-run tradeoff between
unemployment and inflation. However, Friedman
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could exert substantial effects on the real econ-
omy over the short to medium run. In contrast,
Robert Lucas and others reached more dramatic
conclusions, arguing that only unpredictable
movements in monetary policy can affect the
real economy and concluding that policy has no
capacity to smooth the business cycle (Lucas,
1972; Sargent and Wallace, 1975). Although these
studies highlighted the centrality of inflation
expectations for the analysis of monetary policy,
the profession did not succeed in reaching any
consensus about how those expectations evolve,




Research during the past 10 years has been
very fruitful in expanding the profession’s under-
standing of the implications of uncertainty for
the design and conduct of monetary policy.
On the issue of uncertainty about the state of
the economy, Bill’s work continues to provide
fundamental insights regarding the choice of
policy instrument. Money-demand relationships
were relatively stable through the 1950s and
1960s, but, in the wake of dramatic innovations
in banking and financial markets, short-term
money-demand relationships became less pre-
dictable, at least in the United States. As a result,
consistent with the policy implication of Bill’s
1970 model, the Federal Reserve (like most other
central banks) today uses the overnight interbank
rate as the principal operating target of monetary
policy. Bill’s research also raised the possibility
of specifying the operating target in other ways,
for example, as an index of monetary or financial
conditions; and it provided a framework for eval-
uating the usefulness of intermediate targets—
such as core inflation or the growth of broad
money—that are only indirectly controlled by
policy.
More generally, the task of assessing the cur-
rent state of the economy remains a formidable
challenge. Indeed, our appreciation of that chal-
lenge has been enhanced by recent research using
real-time data sets.1 For example, Athanasios
Orphanides has shown that making such real-time
assessments of the sustainable levels of economic
activity and employment is considerably more
difficult than estimating those levels retrospec-
tively. His 2002 study of U.S. monetary policy in
the 1970s shows how mismeasurement of the
sustainable level of economic activity can lead
to serious policy mistakes.
On a more positive note, economists have
made substantial progress over the past decade in
developing new econometric methods for sum-
marizing the information about the current state
of the economy contained in a wide array of eco-
nomic and financial market indicators (Svensson
and Woodford, 2003). Dynamic-factor models,
for example, provide a systematic approach to
extracting information from real-time data at very
high frequencies. These approaches have the
potential to usefully supplement more informal
observation and human judgment (Stock and
Watson, 2002; Bernanke and Boivin, 2003; and
Giannone, Reichlin, and Small, 2005).
The past decade has also witnessed significant
progress in analyzing the policy implications of
uncertainty regarding the structure of the econ-
omy. New work addresses not only uncertainty
about the values of specific parameters in a given
model of the economy but also uncertainty about
which of several competing models provides the
best description of reality. Some research has
attacked those problems using Bayesian optimal-
control methods (Brock, Durlauf, and West, 2003).
The approach requires the specification of an
explicit objective function as well as of the inves-
tigator’s prior probabilities over the set of plausi-
ble models and parameter values. The Bayesian
approach provides a useful benchmark for policy
in an environment of well-defined sources of
uncertainty about the structure of the economy,
and the resulting policy prescriptions give rela-
tively greater weight to outcomes that have a
higher probability of being realized. In contrast,
other researchers, such as Lars Hansen and
Thomas Sargent (2007), have developed robust-
1 A recent example is Faust and Wright (2007).
Panel Discussion
412 JULY/AUGUST 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWcontrol methods—adapted from the engineering
literature—that are aimed at minimizing the conse-
quences of worst-case scenarios, including those
with only a low probability of being realized.
An important practical implication of all
this recent literature is that Brainard’s attenuation
principle may not always hold. For example, when
the degree of structural inertia in the inflation
process is uncertain, the optimal Bayesian policy
tends to involve a more pronounced response to
shocks than would be the case in the absence of
uncertainty (Söderstrom, 2002). The concern about
worst-case scenarios emphasized by the robust-
control approach may likewise lead to amplifica-
tion rather than attenuation in the response of
the optimal policy to shocks (Giannoni, 2002;
Onatski and Stock, 2002; and Tetlow and von zur
Muehlen, 2001). Indeed, intuition suggests that
stronger action by the central bank may be war-
ranted to prevent particularly costly outcomes.
Although Bayesian and robust-control
methods provide insights into the nature of opti-
mal policy, the corresponding policy recommen-
dations can be complex and sensitive to the set of
economic models being considered. A promising
alternative approach—reminiscent of the work
that Bill Poole did in the 1960s—focuses on simple
policy rules, such as the one proposed by John
Taylor, and compares the performance of alterna-
tive rules across a range of possible models and
sets of parameter values (Levin, Wieland, and
Williams, 1999 and 2003). That approach is moti-
vated by the notion that the perfect should not be
the enemy of the good; rather than trying to find
policies that are optimal in the context of specific
models, the central bank may be better served by
adopting simple and predictable policies that
produce reasonably good results in a variety of
circumstances.
Given the centrality of inflation expectations
for the design of monetary policy, a key develop-
ment over the past decade has been the burgeoning
literature on the formation of these expectations
in the absence of full knowledge of the underlying
structure of the economy.2 For example, consid-
erations of how the public learns about the econ-
omy and the objectives of the central bank can
affect the form of the optimal monetary policy
(Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin, 2006; and Orphanides
and Williams, 2007). Furthermore, when the pub-
lic is unsure about the central bank’s objectives,
even greater benefits may accompany achieving
a stable inflation rate, as doing so may help anchor
the public’s inflation expectations. These studies
also show why central bank communications is
a key component of monetary policy; in a world
of uncertainty, informing the public about the
central bank’s objectives, plans, and outlook can
affect behavior and macroeconomic outcomes
(Bernanke, 2004; and Orphanides and Williams,
2005).
CONCLUSION
Uncertainty—about the state of the economy,
the economy’s structure, and the inferences that
the public will draw from policy actions or eco-
nomic developments—is a pervasive feature of
monetary policymaking. The contributions of
Bill Poole have helped refine our understanding
of how to conduct policy in an uncertain environ-
ment. Notably, we now appreciate that policy
decisions under uncertainty must take into
account a range of possible scenarios about the
state or structure of the economy, and those policy
decisions may look quite different from those that
would be optimal under certainty. For example,
policy actions may be attenuated or augmented
relative to the “no-uncertainty benchmark,”
depending on one’s judgments about the possible
outcomes and the costs associated with those out-
comes. The fact that the public is uncertain about
and must learn about the economy and policy
provides a reason for the central bank to strive
for predictability and transparency, avoid over-
reacting to current economic information, and
recognize the challenges of making real-time
assessments of the sustainable level of real eco-
nomic activity and employment. Most funda-
mentally, our discussions of the pervasive
uncertainty that we face as policymakers is a
powerful reminder of the need for humility
about our ability to forecast and manage the
future course of the economy.
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his has been an absolutely wonderful
occasion for me. I deeply appreciate all
those who have come: friends that I’ve
known from way, way back, newer
friends recently formed. And I am very gratified
that Ben Bernanke and John Taylor joined on
the panel. I especially want to thank, above all,
Bob Rasche and the Research Division here,
both for organizing and executing this event—
but even more than that for the support that I’ve
gotten and the intellectual excitement over my
almost 10 years here. We’ve really worked
together in a very collegial way. It’s going to be
hard to imagine being productive without hav-
ing a staff like that behind me. They have been
coauthors, really—staff is really the wrong way
to put it—coauthors on the speeches, some of
which have been published in the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review.
Well, nostalgia takes you only so far. And, so
I want to talk about business, if you will, going
back to some of the earlier literature. How we got
to where we are today does help to inform us
about some very important current issues. I was
fascinated—totally unexpected—that my obscure,
1971 paper would become a centerpiece of some
of the discussion. It’s interesting to reflect on that
because the times were so different. When I was
working on that paper, the policy of the Federal
Reserve was sort of unspecified. It was calculated
meeting by meeting. And what struck me was that
there are (at least the way I looked at it with my
Chicago background) some powerful business
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thing that Friedman and Schwartz demonstrated,
the patterns of money growth and interest rates
over the business cycle. And so my idea was that
we’ve got to find a way to avoid making exactly
the same mistake over and over again. When you
go back and look at the business cycles in the
1920s and 50s and 60s, it just looked like the same
mistake over and over again. So there had to be
some way of formalizing something as a—call it
a rule of thumb—a baseline, and say we should
depart from some baseline behavior only if we
had some pretty good reason for doing so. Other-
wise, we’re just going to be making the same mis-
take over and over again. And, in fact, we did
make the same mistake, in a business cycle sense,
several times more after that. So that was the
origin of that paper; it was nothing more compli-
cated than that.
There was one other piece of it. In this era
there was tremendous disagreement between
those who viewed policy in the context of setting
a monetary aggregate (the Chicago background
that I had) and those who looked at policy entirely
through an interest rate filter. And, of course, the
origin of my 1970 paper was an attempt to make
sense of those different views. You could not
make sense of it in a deterministic model. It had
to have something to do (if there was anything
valid in this debate) with the uncertainty in the
model, the nature of the disturbances. And that
was the origin of my 1970 paper. And the origin
of this sort of combination money growth/interest
rate rule that was discussed earlier here at this
conference was really an effort to try to bridge
the gap between these two very different schools
of thought and how they approached monetary
policy. And obviously John Taylor did a much,
much better job with that later on.
Now, in the discussion of the Svensson and
Williams (2008) paper at this conference, which
I had not seen before, there was something that
sort of rubbed me the wrong way and I couldn’t
put my finger on it right away. I raised the issue
about the model’s assumption about central bank
behavior, the assumption of the state of knowl-
edge in the private sector. And the answer was
the model assumes complete knowledge of the
central bank. As I reflect on that, that’s equivalent
to saying that the central bank has permanent
credibility—no one will ever doubt what the
central bank is going to do. Put another way, that
everyone knows exactly what the central bank is
going to do. And I just don’t believe that’s a valid
assumption. I think credibility has been very
costly to create among central banks around the
world, and I think it’s a terrible mistake to take it
for granted. Credibility is potentially very fragile;
indeed, one of the central things that we need to
pay attention to is how to maintain credibility.
And the way in which you maintain credibility
is a very important part of a rules-based monetary
policy. An important part of maintaining credibil-
ity is to say what you are going to do and then do
it. The central bank does what it said it would do
unless it has a very good explanation for why it
departs from what it said it was going to do.
Of course, we’ve had important institutional
developments here with central bank indepen-
dence, and, really, I think we’ve strengthened
independence in the Federal Reserve although
the law hasn’t changed very much—strengthened
independence in a practical sense. And that’s
been very important. But we should always keep
in mind that the central bank is a political institu-
tion established by law or by treaty—by laws that
can be changed. But even more than that: John
Taylor’s served in the government, I’ve served at
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA); any of
you who’ve been there—Murray Weidenbaum,
who recruited me to the CEA—anybody who’s
worked in the government knows that there are
all sorts of things that are done around the edges
of the law, behind the scenes, that are not exactly
in line with what the law might call for. And
there’s a natural view, which I think is correct, to
be suspicious because central banks in the past
have not always been immune from behavior that
is secret or around the edges of the law. So, to
maintain the confidence that people need to have
in the central bank, you need to do things with a
great deal of careful planning and you have to
maintain a very high level of integrity; you have
to have people there who can be trusted not to
be a part of the political process.
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in a vigorously democratic society where people
try to use government for various purposes that
are not always in the national interest. And cen-
tral banks are inevitably going to remain part of
the political system, as they should. But we need
to maintain the highest possible integrity in order
to maintain confidence. And that’s what I think
bothers me about the Svensson and Williams
paper: It misses a critical component. To me, one
of the ways in which you could lose confidence is
if you started to run experiments. I can’t imagine
having to write a press statement or to give a
speech to explain why it was that we conducted
an experiment that had predictable (and I mean
predictable) consequences of a recession or mild
recession to the purpose of learning more about
some parameter. It’s hard to imagine anything
that we might do that would be more damaging
to long-run credibility.
I’ll describe one of the things that happened
to me when I came to St. Louis, talking a little bit
about my journey here, having been an academic
for most of my professional career. When the
St. Louis Fed’s board of directors recruited me,
John McDonnell was the chairman of the board;
he said, “Bill you have to understand, you are not
going to be able to do any research in this job.”
Well, it hasn’t turned out that way. And, in fact, I
think that with my research productivity jointly
with the economists here (they’ve done all the
hard work), I’ve accomplished more in these 10
years than I had in the previous 20.
The research started as a consequence, really,
of dealing with issues that I needed to understand
as a part of doing my job. But I didn’t know where
I could turn in the journal literature with which
I was familiar to get any help with any of these
issues. One of the very first issues was this ques-
tion: If I am going to give a speech, what am I going
to write, what am I going to talk about? And then
how to deal with press contacts and the Q&A
with press coverage and so forth.
So I started to think abstractly about the whole
process of central bank communication, and I
went back to what I would regard as the two first
principles that come out of the rational expecta-
tions literature. One is that the private sector needs
to know what the central bank is doing. And you
can’t have a good equilibrium if the private sector
doesn’t know what the central bank is doing. A
part of that requires that the central bank itself
knows what it is doing. That’s the place to start.
So, anyone who has been in a classroom, and
most of you here probably have, know that you
hone your own ideas and develop a great deal of
clarity when you are forced to actually stand up
and talk about them. And part of the effort to
understand on a more systematic basis what sort
of policy adjustments we should make comes
from pinning down the fundamental nature of
the policy rule. And John, particularly, of course,
has led the way on that.
So that’s part of the process, and the private
sector learns about what the central bank is doing
in good part just from observing what it is doing
and trying to put some system into that, which
you in principle can extract from what’s done
without any words on our part. But there are
certainly lots of cases where this signal extraction
might go a lot more smoothly and a lot more
quickly if the central bankers would actually talk
intelligently about what they are doing. Think
about the context of a simple learning model, for
example. Suppose that the central bank has been
operating on some value of a parameter and then
decides for whatever reason that it wants to have
a different value of that parameter. Well, it might
take someone with Jim Hamilton’s skills to gener-
ate an enormous number of observations to actu-
ally discover from central bank behavior that the
parameter has changed. And in the meantime,
that means that the private sector is operating
under a different understanding of that parameter
than the central bank is operating under. That
produces expectational problems in terms of the
equilibrium and efficiency. If we could explain
what we are doing, why this parameter has
changed, we ought to be able to move that equi-
librium to the correct point much more quickly.
So that’s part of the task of central bank talk:
Explain what we’re doing and why were doing
it, to help promote a good equilibrium between
the central bank and the private sector—an equi-
librium in which the meshing of knowledge is
really critical to the efficiency of the outcome.
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principle that’s extremely important from the
rational expectations literature: The central bank
ought not to be purveyors of random disturbance.
We ought not to add random noise to the system
either in terms of the actions we take or in terms
of what we say.
So you’re standing up in front of an audience
and you’ve got these two things you’re struggling
with: first, trying to convey genuine information,
and second, trying not to say something that
causes a market disturbance that is decidedly
not helpful. Some of the press people might love
it, but it’s not what I ought to be doing. Now, when
I came, I had no professional guidance in any of
the economics literature about how to do this. I
knew what the basic principles were. But what
do you actually do when you are standing up in
front of an audience? I had no guidance whatso-
ever. Probably I didn’t read enough memoirs; I
don’t know. But I don’t think that people generally
talk about this kind of thing in their memoirs,
either.
So, I started to think a lot about the commu-
nications process, and I know that one approach
that some people take is that, they’re so worried
about the second problem, they give up on the
first and so they really don’t say much of any-
thing. That didn’t seem to me to be satisfactory,
because I thought the first principle of trying to
produce a better understanding in the market-
place of what the central bank is doing was really
an important responsibility of my office.
Another issue is that behavior of the markets
is obviously driven by active and by-and-large
pretty well-informed market participants, not
primarily by Main Street. And a lot of what we
do out here in the Reserve Banks is to wander
around the Districts or, more broadly speaking,
to audiences of all sorts, with different back-
grounds and degrees of expertise. One of the
communications challenges is to be able to give
a speech that says something to well-informed
people and at the same time doesn’t pass com-
pletely over the heads of people who are not so
well informed. Of course, that puts a lot of con-
straints on what you say, but also how you say it.
But why would we care about Main Street?
Well, one of the very important reasons is that
this is the business we’re in. The monetary policy
business that we’re in is designed to improve the
welfare, and maintain a high degree of welfare,
for all the citizens. For Main Street as well as Wall
Street. We need to talk to bankers and traders and
portfolio managers, but we also need to talk to
Main Street because these are our constituents.
At any moment in time, all the time, the interests
of various people in the markets are in conflict:
Some people are long, some people are short,
some people have short-term investments, some
long-term investments, some equity, some bonds,
and so forth. There are a lot of different interests,
and it is extremely important that we serve the
“general interest.” I think that what that means
is that we have broad macroeconomic objectives
that we can summarize quite well in talking about
the dual mandate: maintaining the stable purchas-
ing power of the currency and reducing fluctua-
tions in GDP and employment from equilibrium
paths. If we are successful with these explanations,
we will have done 99.9 percent of what we can
do and what we ought to do.
Another important reason for talking to Main
Street can be illustrated by a story from when I
was at the CEA. That was a difficult period, in the
early 1980s, and there was a lot of commentary
on the part of Congress and to some extent the
administration about Federal Reserve policy.
Knowing a lot about the Fed, I was trying to
explain to people that pushing the Fed was coun-
terproductive from the point of view of the inter-
ests of the politicians themselves. I remember
that a senator, who often made comments about
the Fed, wanted lower interest rates. (By the
way, you may have seen the comment that Alan
Greenspan made, in one of his interviews, that
not once while he was in office did he ever get a
phone call or a letter from a politician recom-
mending higher interest rates. Not once. There is
an asymmetry here.) So, a lot of the politicians
are not all that well informed about monetary
policy, and I remember going up to Capitol Hill
and talking to a very prominent senator and say-
ing, “You have to understand that the Fed values
its independence and it is extremely important
that the Fed not appear to be responding to the
entreaties of politicians. And, therefore, if you
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result that you want by blasting the Fed, because
the Fed can’t respond to that blast. It’s not in your
interest.” He said, “I understand that, but it plays
well on Main Street.” It was very simple. Very
simple. So, one of the reasons to talk to Main
Street is to help people understand why that posi-
tion is wrong. I hope that people will develop a
tin ear to language like that that comes from all
sorts of different directions.
Another issue that I’ve been quite concerned
about during my time in St. Louis has been trade
issues. I have made a good number of speeches
where I’ve talked about trade and capital flows,
the importance of world markets, and trying to
resist—I don’t even like to use the word “protec-
tionism,” because it is good to try to protect peo-
ple—the kind of economic isolationism that many
of these policies encourage. So, we need to talk
to Main Street as well as the monetary experts,
and that makes the communications issues both
challenging and very, very interesting. Very
interesting.
I do want to say one other thing. John referred
to a lecture that I gave earlier this year. He did
not mention that this was an event on Milton
Friedman’s birthday. It was out at the University
of Missouri, and a point that I remember vividly
from those days in Chicago, and a point that I
think has tremendous importance today, is that
Milton always argued—and Brunner and Meltzer,
and others, but Milton sort of led this analysis—
that one of the great advantages of a monetary
aggregates rule is that it allows maximum scope
for the market to respond to disturbances and
move interest rates in a way that will be stabiliz-
ing. Built-in stability is very important. Of course,
there is a huge literature about the built-in stabi-
lizers in the fiscal policy area. The current policy
stance has the advantages of high credibility, well-
anchored inflation expectations, and the possibil-
ity of understanding in a more formal way with
several decoupled interest rates in the model of
allowing the market to do a great deal of the sta-
bilization work. That has enormous advantages in
producing efficient results. It allows the Federal
Reserve at many critical times to sit back and
watch until the situation is clearer in terms of
the arriving evidence. And you can go through
lots of recent cases where there have been very
substantial fluctuations in long-term interest rates
that do an enormous amount of the stabilization
work for us. That provides great clarity in the
stance of policy and at the same time is a frame-
work that produces a tremendous amount of
built-in stabilization.
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